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Abstract
When a fingerprint is located at a crime scene, a human examiner is counted upon to manually compare this print
to those stored in a database. Several experiments have now shown that these professional analysts are highly
accurate, but not infallible, much like other fields that involve high-stakes decision-making. One method to offset
mistakes in these safety-critical domains is to distribute these important decisions to groups of raters who
independently assess the same information. This redundancy in the system allows it to continue operating
effectively even in the face of rare and random errors. Here, we extend this “wisdom of crowds” approach to
fingerprint analysis by comparing the performance of individuals to crowds of professional analysts. We replicate
the previous findings that individual experts greatly outperform individual novices, particularly in their false-positive
rate, but they do make mistakes. When we pool the decisions of small groups of experts by selecting the decision
of the majority, however, their false-positive rate decreases by up to 8% and their false-negative rate decreases by
up to 12%. Pooling the decisions of novices results in a similar drop in false negatives, but increases their false-
positive rate by up to 11%. Aggregating people’s judgements by selecting the majority decision performs better
than selecting the decision of the most confident or the most experienced rater. Our results show that combining
independent judgements from small groups of fingerprint analysts can improve their performance and prevent
these mistakes from entering courts.
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Public Significance Statement
Several reports by peak scientific and regulatory bodies
have been roundly critical of the dearth of evidence sup-
porting traditional forensic methods and practices such
as fingerprint analysis. In response to these criticisms, a
number of experiments have now been conducted, dem-
onstrating that professional fingerprint analysts are im-
pressively accurate compared to novices when
distinguishing between crime-scene prints from the
same and different sources—but they still make mis-
takes. These mistakes are unavoidable, even in other
high stakes, safety-critical domains such as medicine,
aviation, or nuclear power. The aim, then, is to build
safeguards into these systems that mitigate the impact of
these mistakes in practice. In this experiment, we exam-
ine one such countermeasure, which exploits the collect-
ive intelligence of groups of professional fingerprint
analysts. Our results show that pooling the decisions of
small, independent groups of examiners can substantially
boost the overall performance of these crowds and re-
duce the influence of errors. Integrating collective
intelligence processes into existing forensic identification
and verification systems could play a significant role—
alongside effective training methods and evidence-based
practices—in developing reliable and resilient systems to
ensure the rule of law is justly applied.
Collective intelligence in fingerprint analysis
When a fingerprint is recovered from a crime scene, a
computer algorithm is used to compare the print to tens
of millions of prints stored in a database. The algorithm
then returns a list of potential candidates ranked from
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the most to the least similar. It is up to a human exam-
iner to work through this list, comparing the overall pat-
tern and flow of the prints as well as the fine details in
each, such as ridge endings, bifurcations, contours,
islands, dots, breaks, creases, pores, and enclosures. If
the examiner has identified a sufficient number of corre-
sponding features to be confident that the two prints
came from the same person, then this final “same
source” decision is logged into the computer system,
which is then typically “verified” by a second examiner
who—depending on their jurisdiction—may or may not
be blind to the initial examiner’s decision (Thompson,
Black, Jain, & Kadane, 2017).
Despite the fact that fingerprint examiners have been
shown to perform exceptionally well (Searston & Tan-
gen, 2017a; Searston & Tangen, 2017b; Tangen, Thomp-
son, & McCarthy, 2011; Thompson & Tangen, 2014;
Ulery, Hicklin, Buscaglia, & Roberts, 2011), errors have
occurred in the past (Cole, 2005). A correct identifica-
tion can mean the difference between exonerating a
criminal or convicting an innocent person. It is clear
that forensic analysts are working hard to capture crimi-
nals and uphold civil liberties; they have a very high
workload, relentlessly coding evidence, supporting detec-
tives, searching and maintaining databases, writing re-
ports, and testifying as expert witnesses. It is also clear
that—despite everyone’s best efforts—mistakes happen
and will continue to happen, even when people’s lives
are at stake. In medical diagnostics for example, roughly
200,000 patients die from preventable medical errors
each year (James, 2013), and 5% of autopsies reveal le-
thal diagnostic errors that could have been averted (Sho-
jania, Burton, McDonald, & Goldman, 2003). One of the
main conclusions of an authoritative report on these er-
rors by the National Institute of Medicine was that these
mistakes do not result from individual recklessness or
the actions of a particular group. Instead, it is important
to design resilient systems that identify and enhance the
positive capacities of people (Dekker, 2014). Rather than
focusing on “bad apples” at the frontline, the report rec-
ommended the development of safeguards for people’s
fallibility—to “make it harder for people to do something
wrong and easier for them to do it right” (Institute of
Medicine, 2000, p. 2).
One such safeguard that has been highly successful
across several domains has been to exploit the “collective
intelligence” of groups who collaborate to solve prob-
lems well. The “wisdom of crowds” phenomenon dates
back to Aristotle (see Landemore, 2012), it was later in-
vestigated by Galton (1907) and others more formally in
the early 20th century (e.g., Gordon, 1924). The rise of
“crowds” has since been promoted in a series of popular
books (e.g., Surowiecki, 2004; Rheingold, 2007; McAfee
& Brynjolfsson, 2017) and even in a short-lived crime
television drama (Humphrey, 2017), and for good rea-
son, since combining judgements from many individuals
can be surprisingly accurate in prediction markets, fore-
casting sporting outcomes, box office success, and geo-
political and climate-related events (Escoffier &
McKelvey, 2015; Hueffer, Fonseca, Leiserowitz, & Taylor,
2013; Tetlock, Mellers, Rohrbaugh, & Chen, 2014;
Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 2004). The benefits of aggregation
have also been identified across a range of safety-critical
domains including the diagnosis of skin lesions (Kurvers,
Krause, Argenziano, Zalaudek, & Wolf, 2015), the inter-
pretation of mammograms (Wolf, Krause, Carney, Bo-
gart, & Kurvers, 2015), diagnosis in emergency medicine
(Kämmer, Hautz, Herzog, Kunina-Habenicht, & Kurvers,
2017), and matching unfamiliar faces (Balsdon, Sum-
mersby, Kemp, & White, 2018).
A useful analogy for thinking about system failures,
such as medical mishaps or nuclear meltdowns, is the
Swiss cheese model of errors by Reason (2000), which
likens human systems to multiple slices of Swiss cheese
layered on top of each other. Each defensive layer (e.g.,
alarms, physical barriers, automatic shutdowns) could
prevent a breach from occurring, but has unintended
flaws, or holes, which can all align and cause harm by
allowing the hazard to pass through. One can think
about the wisdom of crowds in a similar way: each rater
is depicted as a slice of Swiss cheese; the fewer and
smaller the holes, the more expertise one has, the less
chance there is of making an error. As more people are
layered on, if their decisions are independent and they
approach the problem from different perspectives, then
the holes will be misaligned, preventing the error from
passing through. On the other hand, if the raters all have
the same blind spots—where the “holes” align—then er-
rors may slip through.
In this experiment, we extend this “wisdom of crowds”
approach to fingerprint analysis by comparing the per-
formance of individuals and crowds of professional fin-
gerprint analysts. We test whether crowds of novice
participants are as collectively wise as experts, and also
evaluate the collective intelligence of the groups by com-
paring three different rules for aggregating people’s
responses:
1. Follow-the-majority. Adopt the judgement with the
most support in the group.
2. Follow-the-most-confident. Adopt the judgement
with the highest confidence rating.
3. Follow-the-most-senior. Adopt the judgment of the
most experienced examiner.
Majority and confidence rules have been used success-
fully in high-stakes domains such as breast and skin can-
cer detection (Kurvers et al., 2015), while the seniority
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rule is less common (Kämmer et al., 2017). Pooling the
independent judgments of small groups of diagnosticians
substantially increases performance relative to average
individual performance, often better than the highest
performing member. The best rule often depends on the
size of the group, but in general, if the decisions being
pooled are unbiased, diverse, and derived independently,
then the collective output will typically outperform even
the best member of the group (Surowiecki, 2004). All
three of these decision rules are often used in practice
across a range of applied contexts, but they can lead to
very different outcomes. But what about fingerprint ana-
lysis? Is it more sensible to follow the majority, the most
confident, or the most senior examiner?
Methods
The methods and materials for this experiment are avail-
able and described at length on the Open Science
Framework, including our experiment code, video in-
structions, trial sequences, de-identified data, and ana-
lysis scripts (http://tiny.cc/jbkxcz).
Thirty-six professional fingerprint examiners from the
Australian Federal Police, Queensland Police Service,
Victoria Police, and New South Wales Police (13 females
and 23 males, mean age = 46 years, SD = 8, mean experi-
ence = 16.4 years, SD = 8.6) volunteered their time.
Thirty-six novice participants (25 females and 11 males,
mean age = 21.6 years, SD = 3.6, with no formal experi-
ence with fingerprints) consisting of undergraduate
psychology students who participated for course credit
and members of the broader communities at The Uni-
versity of Queensland and The University of Adelaide
also volunteered their time. A novice control group is
important for establishing expertise (Thompson, Tan-
gen, & McCarthy, 2013), and allows us to examine
whether more domain knowledge makes for a wiser
crowd—which may not always be the case (Herzog &
Hertwig, 2011).
The “crime scene” prints and their matches were col-
lected and developed at The University of Queensland
from undergraduate students who left their prints on
various surfaces (e.g., wood, plastic, metal, and glass), so
unlike genuine crime-scene prints, they had a known
true origin (Cole, 2005). Simulated prints were dusted by
a research assistant (who was trained by a qualified fin-
gerprint expert), photographed, cropped, and isolated in
the frame. A qualified expert reported that each simu-
lated print contained sufficient information to make an
identification if there was a clear comparison exemplar.
Each of the 36 fingerprint examiners was presented
with the same set of 24 fingerprint pairs from the same
finger (targets) and 24 highly similar pairs from different
fingers (distractors) in a different random order. Each
pair consisted of a crime-scene “latent” fingerprint and a
fully rolled “arrest” fingerprint, and participants were
asked to provide a rating on a 12-point scale ranging
from 1 (Sure Different) to 12 (Sure Same). On target tri-
als, when the prints were from the same person, ratings
from 7 to 12 count as a “true positive”; on distractor tri-
als, when the prints were from different people, ratings
from 7 to 12 count as a “false positive.” The distractors
were created by running each latent fingerprint through
the National Australian Fingerprint Identification Sys-
tem—which consists of roughly 67 million fingerprints—
to return the most similar exemplars from the database
(see Tangen et al., 2011, for a similar methodology). On
the first 44 of 48 trials (22 targets, 22 distractors), partic-
ipants were given 20 s to examine the prints. On the
final four trials (two targets, two distractors), they had
an unlimited amount of time to make a decision. These
four untimed trials were cycled across each of the finger-
print pairs across the 36 participants so that each finger-
print pair was examined by three different participants.
After running these 36 fingerprint examiners through
the experiment, we presented an identical set of 36 trial
sequences with the same fingerprint pairs in the same
order to 36 novice participants.
Results
Individual Performance
The individual performance of the 36 novices (yellow)
and 36 experts (purple) is illustrated in Fig. 1. The true-
positive rate (on the left) represents each person’s
Fig. 1 True- and false-positive rate for individual novices and experts
after 20 s of analysis (a) or without a time limit (b). Each jittered data
point represents the mean proportion of true or false positives for
each individual participant. The red shape represents the mean and
vertical bars ±1 standard deviation
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performance when the prints came from the same finger.
“False negatives” on these target trials are the sort of mis-
takes that could potentially lead to false exonerations in
practice. The false-positive rate (on the right) represents
each person’s performance when the prints came from dif-
ferent fingers. “False positives” on these distractor trials
are the sort of mistakes that could potentially lead to false
convictions in practice. These results closely replicate pre-
vious findings (e.g., Tangen et al., 2011; Thompson, Tan-
gen, & McCarthy, 2014) in which experts outperformed
novices on distractor trials, and performed the same or
slightly better than novices on target trials. This benefit of
expertise is evident in Fig. 1a during the 44 trials (22 tar-
gets, 22 distractors) in which participants were given 20 s
to make a decision, and in Fig. 1b during the four trials
(two targets, two distractors) in which participants had no
time limit on making a decision. In the 20-s condition
with 44 trials, experts made true-positive decisions 71%
(SD = 45%) of the time and false-positive decisions 8.5%
(SD = 28%) of the time. Novices, by comparison, made
true-positive decisions 71% (SD = 45%) of the time and
false-positive decisions 50% (SD = 50%) of the time. In the
untimed condition with four trials, experts made true-
positive decisions 85% (SD = 36%) of the time and false
positives 2.8% (SD = 17%) of the time. Novices, on the
other hand, made true-positive decisions 76% (SD = 43%)
of the time and false positives 60% (SD = 49%) of the time.
A 2 (Group: novices vs. experts) × 2 (Rate Type: true
vs. false positives) mixed ANOVA confirmed these im-
pressions with significant main effects of Group, F (1,
70) = 61.34, p < .001, ηg
2 = .33, and Rate Type, F (1,
70) = 342.11, p < .001, ηg
2 = .68, along with a significant
interaction, F (1, 70) = 84.25, p < .001, ηg
2 = .34 in the
20-s condition. The same pattern was evident in the un-
limited condition: significant main effects of Group, F (1,
70) = 27.09, p < .001, ηg
2 = .16, and Rate Type, F (1,
35) = 110.62, p < .001, ηg
2 = .44, as well as a significant
interaction, F (1, 70) = 48.47, p < .001, ηg
2 = .26.
Collective Performance
The most popular, transparent, and easiest method of ag-
gregating people’s decisions is the majority rule (Hastie &
Kameda, 2005). It is based on the commonsense notion
that “many heads are better than one,” and is commonly
used when making decisions in elections and committees:
choose the option that gets more than half of the votes. In
the experiment described above, each of the 48 pairs of fin-
gerprints was either judged to be from “same” or “different”
fingers by 36 professional fingerprint analysts and 36 nov-
ices. For each pair of prints, we took a random sample of
three analysts, and tallied the decisions made by this trio
using the majority rule. We then took another random
group of three analysts, tallied their decisions, and repeated
this process 2000 times and for groups of 3, 5, 7, and so on
for each odd group size up to 35. The result was 2000 ma-
jority decisions for each of the 48 fingerprint pairs (24 tar-
gets and 24 distractors) across the 17 different group sizes.
We repeated this process for novices as well.
The results of the simulation are illustrated in Fig. 2.
The individual true- and false-positive rates from Fig. 1
Fig. 2 Mean true-positive rates for groups of novices and experts after 20 s of analysis (a) or without a time limit (b), and mean false positive
rates for groups of novices and experts after 20 s of analysis (c) or without a time limit (d)
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are represented as “Group Size, Number of Raters: 1” on
the left side of each panel of Fig. 2, respectively. As we
aggregate the 20-s decisions of 3, 5, 7... experts moving
along the x-axis of Fig. 2a and c, the true-positive rate
begins to increase and false-positive rate begins to de-
crease until they begin to level off at nine raters. For
novices, however, their true-positive rate improves as
more raters are included, but their false-positive rate re-
mains at roughly 50% with a group of 35. When people
are given an unlimited amount of time to decide—as il-
lustrated in Fig. 2b and d—the benefit of expertise is
even more pronounced. The true-positive rate increases
from 85% for individuals to 96% for groups of three ex-
perts, but increases from 76% for individual novices to
79% for novice trios. The false-positive rate is 2.8% for
individual experts, and 0% for groups of three experts.
The false-positive rate for novices is 60% for individuals,
and 79% for groups of three novices.
Pooling the independent judgements of a group of
professional fingerprint analysts using a majority rule re-
duced their false-negative rate by up to 12% and their
false-positive rate by up to 8%. Groups of novices, on
the other hand, also received a boost in their true-
positive rate of up to 19% with the majority rule, but
their false-positive rate remained at roughly 50%.
Another way to represent these results is to combine
people’s true- and false-positive rates into a single meas-
ure of discriminability, which calculates how well they can
distinguish between prints from the same finger and prints
from different fingers. We use a non-parametric model of
discriminability that averages the minimum and max-
imum proper receiver operating characteristic curves
through a point (A) for each individual expert and novice
participant; an A value of .5 is chance and 1 is perfect dis-
criminability (Zhang & Mueller, 2005). As illustrated by
the dark purple data points in Fig. 3, expert discrimination
improves when taking the majority decision of small
groups of examiners, leveling off at groups of nine, which
is mirrored by a similar improvement by novices in dark
yellow—just at a much lower level of performance.
The discriminability scores for the majority rule in
Fig. 3 are presented alongside two other aggregation
rules: (1) follow-the-most-confident and (2) follow-
the-most-senior, which both improved the collective
diagnostic performance of medical students (Kämmer
et al., 2017).
We measured people’s absolute confidence on each
trial by first collapsing across same and different on our
12-point scale, which ranged from 1 (Sure Different) to
12 (Sure Same), so each rating ranged from 1 (Unsure)
to 6 (Sure). We then adopted the judgment with the
highest confidence rating. For example, a random group
of five people might provide ratings of 7, 10, 9, 8, and 1,
which equates to confidence ratings of 1, 4, 3, 2, and 6.
Even though four of the five provide a “Same” judge-
ment, the extreme “Different” rating of 1 is the most ex-
treme, so this highly confident examiner’s decision
would be adopted. If people were equally confident
about the two options, one was selected at random.
At the beginning of the experiment, each participant
was asked to indicate how many years of formal experi-
ence they have with fingerprints. Given the follow-the-
most-senior rule, we adopted the judgment of the most
“senior” examiner in the crowd (i.e., the person with the
greatest number of years examining prints). For ex-
ample, a random group of five examiners might have 7,
10, 9, 18, and 25 years of experience. Even though the
four less-experienced examiners each provide a “Same”
judgement, since the most experienced examiner with
25 years of experience said, “Different,” this decision
would be adopted. If examiners have the same level of
experience, the response by one examiner was selected
at random. Since none of the novice control participants
had any experience with fingerprints, this rule was not
applied to their ratings.
The output of these three aggregation rules is depicted
in Fig. 3. All three rules boosted collective performance
compared to individual judgements—particularly in the
unlimited time condition. For novices, the majority rule
produced the largest increase when given 20 s to decide,
and the confidence rule produced the largest gains in
the unlimited condition. But even the output of the best
aggregation rule applied to novice ratings paled in
Fig. 3 Mean discriminability scores (A) for experts (purple) and
novices (yellow) after 20 s of analysis (a) or without a time limit (b).
The different shades of each color represent the three aggregation
rules: (1) follow-the-majority; (2) follow-the-most-confident; and
(3) follow-the-most-senior
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comparison to experts. The majority rule produced the
largest collective performance boost for experts followed
by the confidence rule followed by the seniority rule—
both in the 20 s and unlimited time conditions.
Discussion
Managing errors when lives and livelihoods are at stake
requires resilient systems with safeguards that can toler-
ate mistakes and withstand their damaging effects (Rea-
son, 2000). The wisdom of crowds may provide one
such countermeasure to mitigate their impact, which
motivated us to explore the role of collective intelligence
in fingerprint analysis. Our results showed that individ-
ual experts performed exceedingly well, but they still
made errors. Yet when we combined their decisions
using a simple majority rule, these mistakes disappeared
almost entirely. Pooling the decisions from small crowds
of professional fingerprint analysts makes this wise
group even wiser. Pooling the decisions from small
crowds of novices, however, improved their true-positive
rate, but at the cost of many more false positives. We
tested the effect of two other aggregation methods. The
first is to adopt the decision of the most confident per-
son in the crowd and the second is to adopt the decision
of the most experienced person in the crowd. Both of
these pooling methods produced a slight improvement
for experts compared to individual judgements depend-
ing on the condition, but the majority rule—which is the
most common, transparent, and easiest method to
adopt—delivered the most considerable boost in
performance.
Our results add to the growing body of evidence
that combining independent judgements can greatly
improve the quality of decision-making in high-stakes
domains. What makes this collective intelligence ap-
proach particularly appealing in these contexts is the
robustness or “fault tolerance” that is built into the
aggregation process. Instead of a single examiner
bearing the weight of this important decision, the
burden is distributed equally across several individ-
uals. This redundancy provides some assurance that
the system will not collapse with a single mistake.
Such a system would be straightforward to imple-
ment; it embodies a team-based approach to decision-
making, and would bring greater peace of mind to
analysts, managers, and their organizations. Of course,
it is also possible that examiners could feel less re-
sponsibility for their collective decisions compared to
acting alone, so they may be less conservative or
careful than usual if they assume other examiners will
catch their mistakes (El Zein, Bahrami, & Hertwig,
2019). Despite the promise of a collective intelligence
system, courts would need to figure out how to ac-
commodate cases where decision-making is
distributed (Kemp, White, & Edmond, in press). Time
and resourcing limitations could also be a consider-
ation in adopting a distributed system, but each ex-
pert may not need to replicate the entire analysis that
is currently performed by an individual examiner
(Ballantyne, Edmond, & Found, 2017). Indeed, this ex-
periment was conducted in a tightly controlled setting
and should be replicated under typical conditions
using actual casework materials, software tools, and
timeframes. Assuming that our results generalize to
everyday practice, pooling the decisions of crowds of
expert analysts may provide an effective safeguard
against miscarriages of justice.
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